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Abstract 
 
The corporate governance structure of monasteries is analyzed to derive new insights into solving 
agency problems of modern corporations. In the long history of monasteries, some abbots and monks 
lined their own pockets and monasteries were undisciplined. Monasteries developed special systems to 
check these excesses and therefore were able to survive for centuries. These features are studied from 
an economic perspective. Benedictine monasteries in Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria and German 
speaking Switzerland have an average lifetime of almost 500 years and only a quarter of them broke 
up as a result of agency problems. We argue that this is due to an appropriate governance structure, 
relying strongly on the intrinsic motivation of the members and on internal control mechanisms. 
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WHY ARE MONASTERIES OF INTEREST FOR MANAGEMENT? 
The corporate sector has been plagued by huge scandals related to excessive manager compensation 
and fraudulent bookkeeping. Agency theory – the dominant theoretical approach within the corporate 
governance literature – derives its strength from being able to predict how people change their 
behavior in response to changes in incentives. The theory suggests that external control mechanisms 
will act on behalf of absentee firm owners by linking the interest of the owners with the interest of the 
CEOs and thus preventing such scandals (Fama and Jensen 1983; Jensen and Meckling 1976; Jensen 
and Murphy 1990a; Jensen and Murphy 1990b). While agency theory provides powerful theoretical 
tools for predicting the effects of changes in incentives, at the same time, however, the theory tend to 
constrain their attention to a narrow and empirically questionable view of human motivation, the 
classical homo oeconomicus (see Frey 1999). This paper intends to show that this narrow view of 
human motivation may severely limit progress in understanding incentives and that it is useful to learn 
how institutions beyond corporations – in our case monasteries – undertake their governance. 
In fact, for corporations many of the suggested external incentives have led to new problems (Bebchuk 
and Fried 2004; Jensen et al. 2004; Stefani 2008). Performance-related executive compensation has 
contributed significantly to a lack of transparency in pay policy and in some cases even to a loss of 
control through manipulation of incentives (Aboody and Kasznik 2000; Efendi et al. 2006; Johnson et 
al. 2006; Yermack 1997). The draconian sanctions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act are bound to lead to an 
explosion in costs without slowing the explosion in salaries and fraudulent bookkeeping (Romano 
2005). According to the majority of findings, independent boards have not prevented the fact that 
managers can expropriate shareholders by also entrenching themselves (Boyd 1994; Conyon and Peck 
1998; Core et al. 1999; David et al. 1998; Lambert et al. 1993; Main 1991; Westphal and Zajac 1994).  
These weaknesses of actual corporate governance practice suggest that it might be useful to approach 
these issues from alternate perspectives (Benz and Frey 2007). Recent literature suggests that external 
discipline should be complemented by internal behavioral incentives (Davis et al. 1997; Frey and 
Osterloh 2002; Frey and Osterloh 2006; Osterloh and Frey 2005; Reberioux 2007; Sundaramurthy and 
Lewis 2003; Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia 1998). Internal behavioral incentives like the desire to 
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reciprocate or the desire to avoid social disapproval, also shape human behaviour. By neglecting these 
motives authors may fail to understand the levels and the changes in behaviour. Moreover, internal 
behavioral incentives interact in important ways with external control mechanisms. As a consequence 
economists may even fail to understand the effect of external control on behaviour if they neglect 
internal behavioral incentives. In particular, psychological economics (for an overview see Frey and 
Benz 2004), motivation psychology (for an overview see Deci and Ryan 2000), embeddedness theory 
(Baker 1990; Granovetter 1985) or prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) show that because 
of the existence of internal behavioral incentives, external control may backfire and reduce the agents’ 
performance or compliance with rules.  
The following four aspects are of major importance: 
Firstly, agency theory argues that CEO duality weakens corporate governance by reducing the 
effectiveness of board monitoring (Finkelstein & D’Aveni, 1994). Building on motivation psychology, 
advocates of stewardship theory suggest that the joint structure provides unified firm leadership and 
removes internal or external ambiguity regarding who is responsible for firm processes and outcomes 
(Anderson & Anthony, 1986; Donaldson, 1990; Lipton & Lorsch, 1993). Harris & Helfat (1998: 906) 
document that “In sum, out of 13 studies, 10 find either positive or no effects of duality on firm 
performance”. Furthermore, studies empirically support that CEO duality does not promote CEO 
entrenchment, since it is negatively related to executive compensations (Westphal & Zajac, 1994; 
Conyon & Peck, 1998).  
Secondly, standard agency theory advises that shareholders tie performance to managers’ pay to 
ensure that managers take optimal actions (Jensen and Meckling 1976). The behavioral agency model 
(Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman 1997), combining elements of agency theory with behavioral views of 
decision making under uncertainty, raises questions about the effectiveness of stock option 
compensation to uniformly encourage managerial risk seeking. Larraza-Kintana et al. (2007) would 
seem to support the negative association between CEO stock options and CEO risk taking. Relying on 
psychological economics, Frey & Osterloh (2005) suggest a return to substantially more fixed 
payments for management activity, since variable pay induces people to work for their own benefit 
rather than the team’s output and contributes to the selection of self-serving individuals.  
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Thirdly, agency theory recommends independent directors. They should take their monitoring role 
seriously and protect shareholders as owners of the firm (Bebchuk and Fried 2004; Bebchuk et al. 
2006; Fleischer et al. 1988). However, most researchers found that a higher number of outside 
directors increase executive pay (Boyd 1994; Conyon and Peck 1998; Core et al. 1999; David et al. 
1998; Lambert et al. 1993; Main 1991; Westphal and Zajac 1994). Some authors argue that, due to the 
higher number of personal contacts, insiders or embedded outsiders can control each other and the 
management more effectively (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990; Baysinger et al., 1991). Personal 
relations foster the creation of trust and prevent fraud (Granovetter 1985). 
Lastly, agency theory strongly supports the conclusion that shareholder wealth maximization should 
be the definitive criterion for corporate governance in stock corporations (Murphy 1999; Wiseman and 
Gomez-Mejia 1998). Building on psychological economics, Benz & Frey (2007) argue that democratic 
participation rights are a central element of political constitutions, permitting voters to set in place 
policies closer to their preferences and thereby reducing the principal-agent problem. Osterloh & Frey 
(2006) propose the inclusion of knowledge workers’ representatives on the board for more effective 
monitoring. Firms gain their competitive advantage through firm-specific knowledge rather than 
physical investments (Asher et al. 2005; Grandori 2005). 
While adding to our understanding of internal behavioral incentives, the efficiency of internal control 
mechanisms has been little studied in the corporate governance literature, since compelling empirical 
evidence is still rare. The control mechanisms presently used to govern modern stock corporations are 
strongly reminiscent of Adam Smith’s ‘invisible hand’ theory, in which buyers, i.e. shareholders, 
sellers, CEOs or employees, are free to move silently through the market, constantly creating and 
destroying relationships. With this approach, economic actors act outside a social context and 
therefore react almost slavishly to external incentives (Granovetter 1985). Such governance does not 
include internal arrangements, such as ‘voice’ (Hirschman 1970), expressed as democratic 
participation rights. It also does not consider loyalty and trust (Granovetter 1985; Hirschman 1970), 
expressed in the protection of firm-specific investments, or in the image of the CEO as the steward of 
the firm, or in the belief that rare managerial talents will make efforts for a fixed compensation. 
However, internal arrangements can guard against trouble and facilitate better control (Baker 1990; 
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Granovetter 1985; Lubatkin et al. 2007; Uzzi 1996). In this paper we will discuss the efficiency of 
internal control mechanisms by empirically analyzing how Benedictine monasteries have approached 
their specific corporate governance problems.  
Studying the corporate governance of monasteries offers the following advantages: Firstly, 
monasteries were, and still are, confronted with similar principal agency problems to stock 
corporations: A core problem is that individuals occupying leading positions tend to accumulate 
uncontrolled discretion. However, monasteries address agency problems differently from stock 
corporations. Monastic leaders are disciplined either through members exerting their participation 
rights, or through internal control mechanisms, like the development of value systems and special 
supervisory concepts. Secondly, monasteries are experts in internal control mechanisms: their 
organizational members are committed to one institution for their entire lives. Limited exit-options are 
compensated by more ‘voice’. When members perceive a decrease in the quality of their organization, 
they have the possibility of improving the situation. Furthermore, there are hardly any institutions 
which have implemented and tested normative systems to this degree. Thirdly, Benedictine 
monasteries, with over 1000 years’ history, have more experience in solving agency problems than 
stock corporations. They offer an extensive set of tools, tested in practice over several centuries, for 
exploring the theories mentioned above.  
We use a dataset of all Benedictine abbeys1 in Bavaria, Baden-Württemberg and German-speaking 
Switzerland, and analyze their corporate governance mechanisms in detail. The following questions 
are addressed: Are monasteries capable of solving agency problems? If so, how are they doing this, 
and what are the insights for other organizational forms? Our analysis seeks to contribute to the 
corporate governance literature by providing a set of empirical results to understand the efficiency of 
internal behavioral incentives and their combination with external control mechanisms. The 
Benedictine Monasteries are analyzed from an economic perspective, enhanced by psychological and 
behavioral aspects. The theoretical foundations are principal agency theory, psychological and 
                                                 
1 This analysis refers to Benedictine abbeys, which are autonomous monasteries within the Benedictine Order. 
Where no concrete abbeys are mentioned, we use the more common term monastery. This term is broader and 
also includes affiliated houses.  
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political economics, as well as embeddedness theory. This constitutes a new approach for analyzing 
monasteries.  
 
ARE MONASTERIES CAPABLE OF SOLVING AGENCY PROBLEMS? 
When asking what stock corporations can learn from Benedictine monasteries, the aim is not to 
compare and appraise the two institutions as a whole. Stock corporations are for-profit organizations, 
i.e. economic communities, while monasteries are non-profit organizations, i.e. life partnerships. The 
objectives of the two organizational forms differ fundamentally. The main objective in stock 
corporations is financial value added. The main objective in monasteries is to operate as a steward of 
god (Galbraith and Galbraith 2004; Regula Benedicti 2006). In monasteries, economic success is not 
an aim in itself, but a precondition for the search and glorification of god (Benediktinerkongregation 
1986). The product, capital and personal markets developed in altogether different ways2. Despite 
these obvious differences, they have many similar problems in common, making it possible to 
fruitfully learn from each other.  
Agency problems in stock corporations and monasteries 
Both organizations have the core problem that persons occupying leading positions tend to exercise 
uncontrolled discretion (Berle and Means 1932). In stock corporations, managers can expropriate 
shareholders by entrenching themselves in their positions and staying on the job, even if they are no 
longer competent or qualified to run the firm (Shleifer and Vishny 1989). Poor managers who resist 
being replaced may be the most costly manifestation of the agency problem (Jensen and Ruback 
1983). Managerial opportunism, whether in the form of expropriation of investors or of misallocation 
of company funds, reduces the amount of resources that investors are willing to put up ex ante to 
finance the firm (Williamson 1985). In monasteries, there is no possibility of distributing the wealth 
                                                 
2 For an analysis, the emerging field of religious economics is a good starting position (e.g.Azzi and Ehrenberg 
1975; Held et al. 2007; Iannaconne 1992, 1997, 1998; McCleary and Barro 2006; Miller 2002; Stark and Finke 
2000a). There are also a few related economic papers about the Catholic Church or even the monastic 
organizations (e.g.Ekelund et al. 1996; Ferrero 2002; Padovano and Wintrobe 2008; Salmon 2007; Schmidtchen 
and Mayer 1997; Stark and Finke 2000b). 
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(Hansmann 1980), but there is a strong incentive to make life as luxurious and enjoyable as possible. 
In the long history of monasteries, it was not uncommon for abbots and even entire monasteries to live 
a life of luxury (Helvetia Sacra 1986; Kieser 1987). The next section empirically investigates whether 
monasteries succeeded in developing efficient corporate governance mechanisms against bad abbots 
and their exercise of uncontrolled discretion. 
Empirical analysis: Did monasteries solve their agency problems?  
An important function of corporate governance is to control and discipline management (Daily et al. 
2003). The same goal is shared by the Holy See and the umbrella organizations of the religious orders, 
where disciplining abbots and their convents is a central task (Schmidtchen and Mayer 1997). There 
are at least two indicators of good corporate governance  common to firms and monasteries: the 
survival rate and the reasons for liquidation. A long average lifetime, coupled with minimal control 
problems, indicates crisis-proof, effective corporate governance mechanisms.  
In order to analyze the survival rate of monasteries and the reasons for liquidation, we have collected 
data on all the Benedictine abbeys3 that ever existed in Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria and German 
speaking Switzerland. The sample covers a total of 133 monasteries: 18 in Switzerland, 35 in Baden-
Württemberg and 80 in Bavaria (cf. appendix 1). The empirical examination is limited to Benedictines 
and one common language, since the governance of monasteries varies between the different religious 
orders, regions and cultural areas. Benedictines are one of the largest orders and have greatly 
influenced the development of western economics and work ethics (Faust 1997; Kieser 1987). Data for 
this analysis were obtained from historical chronicles (Germania Benedictina 1970, 1975, 1999; 
Helvetia Sacra 1986) and the Website of the house of Bavarian history 
(http://www.datenmatrix.de/projekte/hdbg/kloster/ index_extern. shtml).  
Figure 1 shows the average lifetime of the monasteries in our sample. The first monasteries were 
established at the beginning of the 8th century. As of 2008, the 133 monasteries have an average 
lifetime of 604 years (cf. appendix 2).  
                                                 
3 We didn’t consider the Benedictine communities of women religious, because they have different governance 
structures. 
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Figure 1 about here 
 
We have modified the average lifetime in three ways. Firstly, the period before 1000AD is ignored 
because a specific Benedictine monasticism had not evolved until then (Helvetia Sacra 1986) . 
Secondly, temporary closures are excluded because a monastic community can survive for years 
without actually having a monastery building: the Thirty Years’ War, the Helvetik in Switzerland and 
the Third Reich are prominent examples. Thirdly, abbeys, which were completely closed and then 
reopened, are counted as separate organizations. With these modifications, the lifespan is reduced to 
463 years, while the number of monasteries is increased to 150 (cf. appendix 3). This is a first 
indication of efficient corporate governance in Benedictine monasteries.  
Table 1 analyzes the reasons for closures. The table lists 119 institutions after the year 1000AD, and 
disregards temporary closures, which implies 150 foundations. 17% of the monasteries were never 
closed down; these institutions still exist today. 4% of the monasteries were voluntarily closed. A large 
proportion of all monasteries, 53%, broke up due to institutional factors. These monasteries fell victim 
to secularization or were violently closed during the Reformation. Beside these outstanding events, a 
revolt of the peasants or the plague could also lead to break ups and forced shutdowns. Endogenous 
factors, e.g. excessive wealth during secularization, or a loss of reputation during the Reformation, 
might have influenced the political climate against the monasteries and thus contributed to the 
closures. In the end, the monastic institutions and their members had little or no influence on the 
outcome of these incidents. Closures occurred regardless of how good the monastic management was. 
Hence we simply speak of external institutional factors. The massive influence of these forces is also 
visible in Figure 2, which shows the number of existing monasteries and collegiate churches over 
time. It can be seen that the Benedictines never recovered from the Reformation in the 16th century and 
Secularization in the 19th century. In the 20th century, the number of monasteries was slowly on the 
rise again.  
Table 1 about here 
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Focusing on agency problems, 13% of the monasteries broke up due to mismanagement, including 
lack of discipline, insolvency or recruitment problems. An analysis of the particular monasteries 
shows that the breakups were mainly due to a combination of all three factors. 7% disappeared due to 
control failures, including hostile takeovers. The changes in governance structures are revealing: 6% 
of the monasteries studied changed into collegiate churches. To a large extent, these changes indicate 
the monastic leaders’ desire for wealth, since collegiate churches permit private ownership and further 
liberties. As shown in Figure 2, governance changes were most prominent when the monasteries were 
economically weak and discipline failed, such as occurred during the wars of the 10th century and the 
Reformation Period. As further shown in Table 1, monasteries unable to survive due to agency 
problems (40 monasteries or 26%) have a shorter average lifetime (387, 313 and 325 years) than those 
that broke down due to external institutional influences or were liquidated voluntarily (568 and 540 
years). The most recent agency problems date back to the years 1763 (changing into a collegiate 
church), 1773 (control failure) and 1862 (mismanagement). Thus, in the last 150 years, agency 
problems were of little importance, which is consistent with the development of efficient governance 
in Benedictine monasteries.  
Figure 2 about here 
 
The findings on the reasons for closures indicate that a maximum of one quarter (26%) of the 
monasteries studied were unable to survive due to agency problems. The vast majority of 
monastic houses were closed due to external institutional factors or they still exist today. On 
average, monasteries survived 463 years, which suggests that agency problems in Benedictine 
monasteries are relatively small. These institutions are extremely stable.  
In order to substantiate that Benedictine governance significantly contributes to the stability of 
monasteries, three aspects are of great importance:4 (1) The basic governance model was formed very 
early and has been more or less constant over time; (2) The adherence to a codex prevents the 
Benedictines from drifting away into other governance structures; (3) The external governance 
                                                 
4 Additionally, in 2007, we interviewed two experts on this subject: Father Nestor Werlen, historian in the 
Capuchin Abbey of Brig and Father Dr. Gregor Jäggi, historian in the Benedictine Abbey of Einsiedeln. 
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mechanisms of the Benedictine Order contribute to this stability, without removing autonomy and 
tradition from the individual monasteries. These three aspects are now discussed in turn. 
The cornerstones of monastic governance can be dated back to the first millennium. Since then, the 
organizational structure has hardly been modified and is composed of the following positions: abbot 
and prior (the ‘CEOs’), officials (the ‘executive board’), the Convent (the religious community of a 
monastery, including padres and spiritual brothers), Consilium (the ‘advisory board’), donators (the 
‘financiers’) and employees. Other stable elements of Benedictine governance are the autonomy of the 
institutions, their non-profit orientation, and the lifelong tenure of the monks to a particular monastery.  
There are some discontinuous elements in Benedictine governance. They refer to disputes over the 
structured routine, including the time allotted to prayer, reading and work, the culture of learning, 
including selection processes, education and the value system of the Benedictines. There are also 
disputes over the compensation system, which varied from little collective ownership to excessive 
individual ownership. Nevertheless, the Benedictines have always returned to the ideals set out by 
holy Benedict and his rules, a book of precepts written for monks living in a community (Regula 
Benedicti 2006, Eckert 2000). Adherence to a codex kept the monasteries from drifting away into 
other governance structures and helped them to master difficult times.  
The external control mechanisms of the Benedictine governance were continuously developed. The 
external controllers, i.e. umbrella organizations, as well as the legal sequence of courts, show constant 
refinement and perfection, whether they were dealing with the total autonomy of a monastery or a 
friendly exchange and loose ties, or subsequent organization into Congregations and the 
Confederation. The Benedictines have developed sophisticated mechanisms of governance, in 
particular carefully planned ‘visitations’ from members of the order outside the monastery in question.  
The next section examines these governance mechanisms. Agency problems seem to be negligible in 
today’s Benedictine monasteries. This can be attributed to external control and its interplay with 
internal control.5  
                                                 
5 We substantiated this assumption in an interview with archabbot Benno Malfèr, who has been active for 8 years 
as the supreme ‘visitator’ of the Swiss Benedictine Congregation. He cannot remember any trouble concerning 
mismanagement, control failure, or management enrichment. A media analysis of the Benedictine abbeys in 
Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria and German speaking Switzerland of recent decades also support this appraisal. 
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HOW THE BENEDICTINES SOLVE PRINCIPAL-AGENCY PROBLEMS  
Why do Benedictine monasteries survive so well and seldom fall prey to mismanagement, hostile 
takeovers or change of governance? This section introduces the specific corporate governance of the 
Benedictines in detail in order to contrast it with the governance of modern stock corporations.6 The 
first paragraph argues that monasteries build on strong internal control through a common value 
system, careful selection, socialization, participation, and monitoring. The second paragraph points out 
that the Benedictines backed up their internal arrangements with external arrangements, e.g. periodical 
monitoring or jurisdiction. Figure 3 gives a graphical overview of the corporate governance of a 
Benedictine monastery.  
Figure 3 about here 
 
Internal governance mechanisms 
Internal control in the Benedictine monasteries can be divided into two main categories. Firstly, 
monasteries build on common value systems, careful selection and rigorous socialization processes. 
These arrangements can be explained by embeddedness theory and psychological economics. 
Secondly, monasteries grant participation rights to their monks and build largely on internal 
monitoring processes. Participation rights are in line with the recommendations of political economics. 
These internal monitoring processes in monasteries reduce agency problems. 
Embeddedness in common value systems 
While stock corporations establish control and supervisory institutions in order to monitor decision 
making, monasteries refer to common value systems in order to discuss possible solutions and come to 
conclusions (McGrath 2007). These value systems go far beyond ‘codes of best practice’. The 
Benedictine value system is based on three cornerstones: the bible, the rule of St. Benedict and the 
                                                 
6 Since there is hardly any literature on the corporate governance of monasteries, the following sources are used: 
rule, law and constitutions of Abbeys and Congregations, and expert interviews with Guido Muff (prior of the 
Abbey of Engelberg), Reto Krismer (managing director of the Abbey of Einsiedeln), Wolfgang Gehra (managing 
director of the Abbey of Plankstetten), and Benno Malfèr (archabbot and supreme visitator of the Swiss 
Benedictine Congregation and abbot of the Abbey of Muri Gries).  
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tradition of a particular monastery. Besides being based on the bible, the rule of St. Benedict is the 
most important influence in the daily life of a monastery. It contains universal rules similar to e.g. the 
categorical imperative of Kant. Benedict’s writings reverberate in personal and economic interactions. 
Its universal character prevents bureaucratic decisions and actions. Only when problems arise, does 
monastic or canon law come into effect.7  
The emphasis of Benedictines on implementing value systems, instead of using control- and 
supervisory institutions, is in line with the assumptions of psychological economics, therein in 
particular with behavioral economics, e.g. fairness-reciprocity theory (Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 
2004; Falk et al. 2003; Rabin 1993) or the relevance of social (dis)approval (e.g. Akerlof 1980; Fehr 
and Falk 2002). Individuals react to a large extent based on their beliefs about other people’s 
intentions. From this perspective, common value systems signal friendly intentions and “people feel 
obligated to respond to positive behavior received with positive behavior in return” (Groves et al. 
1992: 480). Control and supervisory institutions, on the other hand, are more likely to signal neutral 
(economic exchange related) or even ‘unfriendly’ intentions, in the sense that these might signal 
distrust or insinuate the selfish nature of the employees (McGregor 1960). The empirical literature 
supports these insights. For example, Falk, Fehr and Fischbacher (2003) show in an experiment that 
proposers of fair intentions are met with more voluntary co-operation by responders than unfair 
intentions. Further evidence comes to the same conclusion: beliefs about fairness matter (Blount 1995; 
Cox 2004; Sobel 2005). The effect of social (dis)approval and its interaction with social norms and 
incentives has to be mentioned. An appropriate design of values, which fosters social approval, makes 
individuals happier and affects their behavior (for an overview see Fehr and Falk 2002; Gächter and 
Fehr 1999). To ensure that common value systems are suitable in guiding the individual behavior of 
the members of a monastery, the Benedictines build on careful selection and rigorous socialization 
processes.   
Selection. Candidates for a monastic career go through a tight selection process in order to test their 
suitability. The selection process is more or less identical in every Benedictine monastery. There are 
four stages: Every candidate, independent of application credentials, is welcome to live in a monastery 
                                                 
7 Interviews made in 2007 with Father Guido Muff, Prior of the Abbey of Engelberg and Father Gregor Jäggi, 
Abbey of Einsiedeln. 
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for a few months. During these months, the candidate learns a lot about the value system of the 
Benedictines and has the opportunity to consider his motives carefully before becoming a full 
member. Thus, instead of pre-selecting employees, monasteries make use of self-selection. The 
decision to stay is, in part, handed back to the candidate. One could argue that today’s selection 
process is less important, because only individuals with the right motives choose a monastic career. 
However, many aspirants do not fulfill the requirements. One year probation follows. Within this year, 
the novice learns the background of the value system, the Holy Scripture and church law. The other 
monks scrutinize his suitability. Temporary profession follows, lasting three years, and containing a 
monastic apprenticeship, or the beginning of studies. The underlying reason is that human beings 
sometimes change their minds. Profound education is required to provide a sound basis for decision-
making. Only then can full membership, called solemn profession, be celebrated. Solemn profession 
involves the unconditional commitment of both parties. In each case, the Convent, i.e. the religious 
community of a monastery, has to give its blessing. (Schweizer Benediktinerkongregation 1986). 
Following the final oath to obey the Benedictine way of life, the new entrant becomes a full member 
of the monastic community and has broad participation rights. 
The selection process of monasteries is in line with the theoretical assumptions of the embeddedness 
approach (Baker 1990; Granovetter 1985; Lubatkin et al. 2007; Uzzi 1996). Since purposive actions 
are embedded in ongoing systems of social relations, such systems contain valuable information about 
one’s own past. This happens in collaboration with the individual or through information from a 
trusted source that has dealt with that person and found him or her trustworthy. In contrast to second-
hand information, e.g. certifications or testimonials, this information is cheaper, richer, more detailed 
and accurate. First-hand information therefore enables the selection of trustworthy individuals. 
The embeddedness principle, relying on first-hand information, has been empirically supported in the 
field of market transactions. For example, Baker (1990) characterizes the stock options market to be a 
social structure represented by networks of actors. The empirical analysis demonstrates that actors are 
subject to bounded rationality, and some act opportunistically. These actors must be embedded in 
networks; otherwise impeded communication among actors results in exacerbated option prices. Uzzi 
(1996) empirically analyzes the New York apparel economy and shows that firms organized in 
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networks, and thus relying on first-hand information about their trading partners, have higher survival 
chances than firms which maintain arm’s length market relationships, i.e. firms relying on second-
hand information about their trading partners. Empirical studies also suggest that CEOs promoted 
internally, compared to CEOs hired from outside, not only increase the future performance of a firm 
(Furtado and Rozeff 1987; Rost et al. 2008; Worrell and Davidson 1987; Zajac 1990), but also earn 
approximately 15.3 percent less (Murphy and Zábojník 2004). Finally, professional service firms, like 
the Boston Consulting Group or McKinsey, successfully practice the embeddedness approach as a 
selection tool in order to find suitable, trustworthy employees. Promotion decisions are fully 
dependent on first-hand information from numerous individuals about the behavior of a candidate. 
Furthermore, being appointed a partner is dependent on the agreement of all the partners in the office. 
However, in contrast to monasteries, professional service firms narrow down the pool of potential 
candidates based on second-hand information, e.g. using the curriculum vitae, certificates, testimonials 
and volunteering.      
Socialization. In order to ensure living and working together successfully, careful socialization and 
the composition of an organizational identity is crucial. Two rules are essential: Firstly, with respect to 
the Benedictine values, dialogue among the monks is fostered, and any disagreements are addressed 
and solved. Secondly, a monastic partnership depends on a fulfilling life environment. Regarding the 
monks’ professional lives, the Benedictines see work as a vocation and not only a professional 
activity; work is considered part of one’s personal growth. This ethic has its sources in the first 
millennium, where Benedict saw work as a way of finding inner peace (Kieser 1987).  
The Benedictines promote equality of treatment in daily life in order to integrate new members. From 
the very beginning, the novice is a part of the community; he participates in the same structures, 
including the daily routine, prayers, and meals. Being treated as an equal in a life and work community 
facilitates the establishment of common values (Wenger and Snyder 2000).  
The Benedictines also use extensive learning programs, in which their codex and their knowledge are 
used to shape a common identity and facilitate the growth and development of all members (Reiber 
2003). Apart from joint prayers, monasteries have implemented other learning practices, like daily 
readings at the communal dinner table. These readings deal with diverse topics, like the bible, politics, 
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philosophy or the history of the Benedictines and the respective monastery. Besides education, these 
institutions strengthen the awareness of belonging to something bigger than the particular monastery. 
The socialization lasts a lifetime and encourages an intrinsic transfer of the overall value system. 
According to psychological economics, the socialization principles of the Benedictines increase the 
purpose and the intrinsic motivation of each organizational member, and thus the welfare of the whole 
organization (Deci 1975; Frey and Osterloh 2002). The incomplete contract literature emphasizes that, 
in complex environments, such as organizations, complete contracts cannot be written or enforced 
(Milgrom and Roberts 1992). Therefore honesty, intrinsic job satisfaction and intrinsic motivation lead 
to better results from the contracted parties than relying on monitoring or on monetary incentives 
(Gintis and Khurana 2006; Jensen 2006). Experiments confirm that employees exert more effort if 
labor contracts are regarded primarily as a ‘gift exchange’ rather than as a disciplinary tool (Akerlof 
1982; Irlenbusch and Sliwka 2003). As far as knowledge work is concerned, ‘management by intrinsic 
motivation’ (Frey and Osterloh 2002; Osterloh et al. 2002) might even become the most important 
factor in sustaining a competitive advantage.  
It is, however, more difficult to ‘guide’ this kind of motivation: intrinsic motivation cannot be 
enforced; it can only be encouraged. According to crowding theory (Frey 1997) and self-determination 
theory (Deci 1980; Deci and Ryan 2000), organizations can encourage intrinsic motivation by creating 
an intrinsically rewarding job environment (Hackman and Lawler 1971; Hackman and Oldham 1974) 
and by supporting employees’ feelings of autonomy, competence and relatedness (Deci 1980; Deci 
and Ryan 2000). Monasteries today strive for an intrinsically rewarding job environment. Individuals 
have the chance to develop skills and express themselves based on their interests. They also support 
the monks’ feelings of competence and belonging, for example by emphasizing education or fostering 
a strong community, described by many monks as a family. As mentioned already, a joint attempt at 
clarifying any points of contention in a mutually respective and fair way contributes to an intrinsically 
rewarding job environment. The empirical literature suggests that such surroundings and feelings of 
competence and relatedness increase intrinsic motivation (Gagné et al. 1997), contextual performance 
(Brief and Motowidlo 1986; Gagné 2003; Organ 1988; Van Dyne et al. 1994), contributions to the 
common good (Fehr and Falk 2002; Frey et al. 1996; Frey and Meier 2004; Gneezy and Rustichini 
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2000), as well as co-operative learning (Janz and Prasarnphanich 2003). To run a monastery, 
Benedictines often induce their members to specialize, thus fostering diversity. Diversity not only 
facilitates broader decision making (Osterloh and Frey 2006), but also creativity and innovation 
(Perry-Smith and Shalley 2003). History substantiates that monasteries have contributed to economic 
progress through numerous innovations; they have produced excellent scientists, and have supported 
administrative inventions, such as the division of labor (Kieser 1987).    
Members’ Voice 
The abbot (the ‘CEO’ of a monastery) carries the main responsibility for spiritual and economic 
concerns, represents the monastery in external affairs, delegates duties and is in charge of the well-
being of every friar. Unlike stock corporations, the monks possess substantial participation rights and 
monitor the management (Schweizer Benediktinerkongregation 1986; St.Ottilien 
Benediktinerkongregation 2004). 
Participation. The Convent consists of all padres and brothers with a solemn profession. Every one of 
these monks has equal rights and may vote in elections. The Convent has four major tasks: Firstly, the 
Convent is responsible for decision-making in important business affairs, e.g. the acceptance of a 
novice as a full member or the expansion of a monastery through acquisition. Secondly, the Convent 
democratically elects the abbot (recently, the tenure of an abbot in some abbeys has been restricted to 
12 years instead of being lifelong) and employee representatives for the ‘advisory board’, i.e. the 
Consilium. Thirdly, the Convent evaluates whether a proposed prior (the vice ‘CEO’) is eligible. 
However, in order to make sure that the team in charge works in harmony, the prior is selected and 
nominated by the abbot. Fourthly, members of the Convent have the right to advance requests, to give 
opinions and to foster dialogue among the monks (Eckert 2000).   
Monitoring. Monasteries complement participation processes with internal monitoring processes. 
Similar to some stock corporations, monasteries have a two-tier board structure, i.e. there is a 
management board (all executive directors, i.e. the abbot and the officials) and a separate advisory 
board (some executive and some ‘non-executive’ directors, i.e. the Consilium). In contrast to stock 
corporations, the Consilium is a supervisory board consulting the management team. It only has the 
power to decide in rare, specific cases. The Consiliums’ main task is to consult with the management. 
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They discuss contentious issues without having the final responsibility for major business decisions. 
The Consilium exclusively consists of insiders, i.e. elected members of the Convent (employee 
representatives) and nominated members of the management team (officials) (Schweizer 
Benediktinerkongregation, 1986). The reliance on insiders stands in sharp contrast to agency theory 
(Lorsch & MacIver, 1989; Mizruchi, 1983; Zahra & Pearce, 1989), where only outsiders are believed 
to be independent of the firm management and thus are taken to be able to prevent agency problems 
(Fleischer, Hazard, & Klipper, 1988; Waldo, 1985).  
According to political economics, the voice of employees, i.e. relying on inside monitoring and 
comprehensive participation rights, is important in preventing agency problems. Employees have 
personal experience with managers and are thus highly suitable for selecting and controlling the 
management (Benz and Frey 2007; Hirschman 1970). Employees invest in firm-specific knowledge 
(Osterloh and Frey 2006). These investments cannot be protected, or only at high cost, by contracts ex 
ante when the parties enter into a relationship. As a consequence, employees have no incentive to 
undertake firm-specific investments if their bargaining position is not protected after they enter into 
the labor contract (Blair and Stout 1999; Freeman and Lazear 1996; Zingales 1998). However, the 
most relevant asset for a company’s sustained competitive advantage is firm-specific knowledge, 
which needs to be generated, accumulated, transferred, and protected (Foss and Foss 2000; Grandori 
and Kogut 2002; Penrose 1959). Only democratic election systems create strong competition for 
filling unfilled positions (Benz and Frey 2007; Schelker and Eichenberger 2004). Democratic 
constitutions actively promote the principle of checks and balances. This does not prevent one person 
or branch from dominating for a period of time, but it ensures that the other persons or branches can 
reassert themselves in due time (Frey 1983). 
The substantial participation rights in monasteries stand in sharp contrast to the principle of hire and 
fire that exists in many stock corporations: padres and brothers have a voice in running the monastery 
(Auf der Maur 2007), they can discipline the abbot and the management team (the officials) and thus 
prevent fraudulent behavior. The (lifelong) tenure of monks is compensated by considerable voting 
rights and co-determination. They provide a strong incentive to invest in firm-specific know-how 
(Osterloh and Frey 2006).  
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A large literature emphasizes the importance of these ideas for stock corporations. The advantages of 
inside control are empirically supported. Contrary to the argument that outside directors are more 
effective in defending the interests of shareholders, most research finds that a higher proportion of 
outside directors increases executive pay and, along with it, agency problems (Boyd, 1994; Conyon & 
Peck 1998; Core, Holthausen, & Larcker, 1999; David & Kochhar & Levitas, 1998; Lambert, Larcker, 
& Weigelt, 1993; Main, 1991; Westphal & Zajac, 1994). Some authors argue that, thanks to a higher 
extent of firm-specific knowledge, insiders can control the management more effectively (Baysinger & 
Hoskisson, 1990; Baysinger et al., 1991). The idea of democratic institutions and participation rights 
has been transferred to stock corporations (Hansmann 1990). The case of monasteries suggests that 
CEO duality does not necessarily weaken corporate governance. Agency theory argues that CEO 
duality generally promotes CEO entrenchment by reducing the effectiveness of board monitoring 
(Finkelstein & D’Aveni, 1994). Advocates of stewardship theory argue that the joint structure 
provides unified firm leadership and removes any internal or external ambiguity with respect to who is 
responsible for firm processes and outcomes (Anderson & Anthony, 1986; Donaldson, 1990; Lipton & 
Lorsch, 1993). The empirical evidence is accordingly mixed: some empirical studies support that CEO 
duality is positively related to executive compensation and thus increase agency problems (Beatty & 
Zajac, 1994; Boyd, 1994; Core, Holthausen, & Larcker, 1999; Fiss, 2006; Gray & Canella, 1997; 
Sridharan, 1996). Other studies show a negative effect on executive compensation; thus, CEO duality 
weakens agency problems (Westphal & Zajac, 1994; Conyon & Peck, 1998). Benedictine monasteries 
suggest that a combination of both theories may solve agency problems best: On the one hand, the 
responsibility of the abbot in monasteries is extensive. He has to act like an ‘entrepreneur’ because he 
cannot shift his responsibility to the board. On the other hand, his power is reduced through 
competitive elections and extensive internal monitoring.   
External governance mechanisms 
The interplay between internal and external control mechanisms in Benedictine monasteries is of 
particular interest for stock companies. History shows that the internal control mechanisms of 
monasteries sometimes fail. For example, in situations where the abbot and the Convent join in 
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enriching themselves, or simply do not care about the economic situation, external control is 
important. The external control is hierarchically organized and consists of jurisdiction and periodical 
monitoring. Each monastery is embedded in a hierarchical structure of Congregations, the Benedictine 
Confederation and the Holy See. The Congregation is the umbrella organization of the monasteries, in 
most cases within a geographical region. It is responsible for the monitoring of a monastery in its area 
of accountability. Abbots and some delegates of the respective houses represent each Congregation. 
These representatives form the Congregational chapter and elect the archabbot as president. The 
archabbot is recruited from an associated monastery to guarantee internal know-how. Each 
Congregation is a part of the Benedictine Confederation. The Confederation is an independent 
institution and facilitates the exchange of experiences between Congregations and the Holy See, but 
has no direct influence on the decision process. 
Jurisdiction. Benedictine monasteries belong to the Catholic Church and its law, and depend on the 
Holy See. Besides church and constitutional law, the legal norms of the Congregation are binding for a 
particular monastery. The jurisdiction of the Congregation is the first instance outside the monastery 
where disputes are settled. The Congregation supervises the election of abbots and organizes the 
‘visitations’ of monasteries. They complement this law with their own statutes, the so-called 
Consuetudines (1991).  
Periodical monitoring. As the legal rules are very general with respect to economic issues, the so-
called ‘visitation’ is the most important tool for disciplining the Convents. Every four to five years, 
delegates of the Congregation visit a community to evaluate the condition of the monastery. The 
visitation considers not only the economic situation of a monastery and its fields of activity, but also 
the spirit and the discipline of the community and their members, the personal relationships between 
monks and their superiors, and the abuse of authority (Schweizer Benediktinerkongregation 1986). In 
addition to auditing, the visitors make use of questionnaires and interviews to detect any problems and 
failures. They analyze processes in-depth, ask specific questions and refer to aspects, which pass 
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unnoticed in the normal daily routine. The most important function of ‘visitations’ is to induce 
reflection, and not to exercise control and discipline.8  
The organization of the external control in monasteries corresponds to insights in political economics. 
In democratic public government, independent institutions control the heads of government and the 
members of the cabinet - the court of accounts or, in the United States, the General Accounting Office 
(Benz and Frey 2007). These courts are usually part of the judicial branch, but are sometimes directly 
elected by the citizens. Empirical evidence indicates that such courts successfully restrain local 
governments from abusing their power and induce them to act more in accordance with the citizens’ 
interests (Schelker and Eichenberger 2004).  
The corporate sector often fails in clearly separating the executives and external auditing functions. In 
many cases, the auditing firm is chosen by the CEO and general management (Economist 2004). Stock 
corporations can learn from the public sector by strengthening the independence of the auditing 
process (Benz and Frey 2007). Stock corporations could rely on the democratic mechanism of direct 
elections for the members of the audit committee and the auditing firm by the shareholders.  
The monastic approach suggests that stock corporations could enrich independent auditing processes 
by ‘visitations’. ‘Visitations’ not only control the books and the economic situation but also consider 
firm culture, i.e. the spirit and the discipline of the monks, the personal relationships between monks 
and their superiors, and the abuse of authority. In contrast to other forms of external control 
mechanisms, e.g. the elimination of CEO duality, independent boards of directors, pay-for-
performance, or draconic punishments envisaged by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, this kind of external 
control does not reduce intrinsic motivation of the management or the employees. Crowding-out of 
intrinsic motivation only occurs if people perceive an external intervention as controlling and hence as 
reducing their self-determination (for an overview compare Deci et al. 1999; Frey and Jegen 2001). 
DISCUSSION: WHAT CAN STOCK CORPORATIONS LEARN?  
Our paper starts with the observation of unsolved agency problems in stock corporations. This kind of 
governance disregards internal mechanisms, such as voice, and intrinsic motives, such as loyalty or 
                                                 
8 Interviews carried out in 2007 with Reto Krismer, managing director of the Abbey of Einsiedeln and Archabbot 
and first ‘visitator’ of the Swiss Congregation Benno Malfèr. 
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trust. These internal arrangements help with avoiding problems and facilitate better control. The 
corporate governance of stock corporations can learn from monasteries, which emphasize these 
internal mechanisms and demonstrate their operability. Many of these governance mechanisms are in 
line with new proposals by psychological or political economics and embeddedness theory. In view of 
current corporate scandals, such as the bankruptcies of Enron, Qwest, Global Crossing and 
WorldCom, where CEOs collected an average salary of over $100 million (Bratton 2002), monasteries 
show that alternative models serve to enhance corporate governance. Beside the plea to find new ways 
of solving agency problems, the example of monasteries offers concrete ideas.  
Hardly any organizations exist which internalize value systems in such a profound and perfect way. 
Corporations may refer to their own tradition. Many companies are proud of their ‘firm culture’. It 
serves to attract suitable employees, customers and shareholders, and should guide their behavior. 
Monasteries demonstrate that common values can be fostered if they are an integral part of living and 
working together. This requires rigorous and credible selection criteria and continuous socialization 
processes. Stock corporations could learn by using a probation period for candidates, rather than 
relying on second-hand information, like grades, testimonials, or multiple-choice aptitude tests. Many 
companies hire top managers from outside. The example of monasteries shows that internal 
promotions can take advantage of comprehensive information about a candidate’s past behavior. 
Companies often engage in sporadic ‘team building’ measures, such as corporate parties, corporate 
excursions, or corporate training. Firms can learn from monasteries to socialize, inform and educate 
their employees with regular and sustainable tools, such as lunch seminars or the examination of their 
own identity. Companies often fill vacancies based on job advertisements and precise job descriptions. 
The example of monasteries shows that work is more than a career – it is seen as a vocation that 
fosters one’s personal and spiritual growth, emphasizes cooperation rather than competition and 
focuses on increasing work effort and efficiency.  
Monasteries are specialists in the accumulation of internal know-how. While tenure of employees 
within companies is certainly not lifelong, and often quite short, firms should encourage firm-specific 
investments by giving appropriate incentives to their employees. The monastery approach 
demonstrates that democratic elections of the CEO, internal monitoring processes, and employee 
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representation on an advisory board foster and protect firm-specific investments by reducing agency 
problems. Stock corporations could pre-select suitable CEO candidates by relying on first-hand 
information from numerous individuals about the behavior of these candidates. Before election, these 
candidates could – like politicians – present their strategic vision for the firm. Such systems create 
strong competition for unfilled positions and are based on personal experience with the managers. 
Further, stock corporations could democratically elect employee representatives for an advisory board. 
Its main task should be to consult with management, i.e. to discuss contentious issues without having 
the final responsibility for major business decisions. This kind of inside monitoring and participation 
rights actively promotes the principle of checks and balances and pays attention to firm-specific 
knowledge without shifting the responsibility from management to employees.   
Finally, stock corporations can learn from monasteries regarding the organization of external control. 
External control institutions in stock corporations should obtain their independency by counting on 
shareholder representatives. In contrast to monasteries, which operate as life partnerships and thus are 
mainly responsible for insiders, the main objective in stock corporations is financial value added for 
shareholders. In stock corporations, shareholder representatives could supervise the election of the 
CEO and directly elect the members of the audit committee and the auditing firm. Further, shareholder 
representatives could monitor a stock corporation with periodical ‘visitations’ in order to control the 
firm culture, the personal relationships between employees and management, and any abuse of 
authority. 
When considering what corporations can learn from Benedictine monasteries, it should be kept in 
mind that the two differ fundamentally. Three limitations of the monastic approach need to be 
addressed: the tendency to promote groupthink, the danger of dictatorship and the critical subject of 
life long commitment.  
Firstly, since monasteries build on strong and uniform value systems, individuals not only increase 
their social identity with the group, but groups also become more cohesive (Tajfel 1981). The theory 
of groupthink hypothesizes that cohesive groups are most likely to experience groupthink (Janis 1972; 
Janis 1982). Groupthink includes the belief in the inherent morality of the group and stereotypes of 
out-groups. It leads to the systematic and emotional devaluation of ideas which were not discovered or 
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launched within their own social collective (Turner and Pratkanis 1998). Such a groupthink-
phenomenon leads to the not-invented-here (NIH) syndrome (Katz and Allen 1982), which refers to an 
actor’s negative attitude towards external technologies and innovations. As a result, technological 
opportunities or innovative ideas are only exploited to a suboptimal degree. Further, groupthink 
promotes aggressiveness towards other groups and can even lead to violence, e.g. terrorist acts (Frey 
2004; Frey and Luechinger 2002). 
Secondly, social comparison theory hypothesizes that cohesive groups are more susceptible to expert 
power (Festinger 1954), leading to dictatorship and abuse of power (Coleman 1990). Individuals with 
high potential can help to increase the innovativeness of social systems because they avert the 
constitution of a group consensus (Hauschildt and Schewe 1997; Rost et al. 2007). But there is the 
possibility of a drawback in that the opinion forming of groups is dependent on a few individuals. 
Such systems have a disposition to over-reliance. Blind trust often ends in the abuse of a dominant 
position, and thus increases agency problems (Conger and Kanungo 1987).  
Thirdly, the life long commitment to a monastery has to be considered. Strong commitment is 
desirable, but not in such an absolute way as in monastic institutions. While giving voice and 
developing loyalty, they (consciously or unconsciously) tend to build exit barriers. When exit costs are 
exorbitant, hindering people from leaving, negative outcomes, like discouragement, will occur 
(Hirschman 1970). 
For these reasons, stock corporations have to balance the advantages and disadvantages of common 
value systems and commitment. Value systems should be strong enough to select and socialize 
appropriate employees and open enough to avoid dogmatism and unbalanced power, i.e. value systems 
must also honor new and challenging ideas. Stock corporations can prevent group cohesion by 
promoting the diversity of their employees and their managers. Diversity includes nationality, gender, 
age, educational, functional or occupational backgrounds and reduces groupthink and expert power 
(Flap 1988). Commitment should be fostered, without implementing exit barriers and constraining the 
employees too much.  
Finally, the monastic constitution has some drawbacks and can learn from stock corporations. Many 
monastic institutions, which have to face substantial challenges, do so. While we argue that both 
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institutions can learn from each other, we highlight the many aspects in which modern corporations 
can profit from the history proven monastic organization of Benedictine abbeys.  
CONCLUSION 
The monastery approach demonstrates that stock corporations can prevent agency problems by 
complementing external discipline with internal behavioral incentives and by utilizing democratic, 
supportive external control mechanisms. Internal behavioral incentives complement agency theory’s 
conception of the homo oeconomicus by referring to intrinsically motivated actors, who not slavishly 
react to external incentives. Internal arrangements facilitate a better control through voice in the form 
of democratic rights of participation and through loyalty and trust expressed in the protection of firm-
specific investments. Democratic, supportive external control mechanisms expand agency theory’s 
conception of the homo oeconomicus by referring to self-determined actors, who mainly react to 
external incentives which are in their interest and do not crowd out their intrinsic motivation.  
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FIGURES AND TABLES  
Figure 1. Average lifetime of Benedictine monasteries (Side of graph: Number of Benedictine 
Monasteries) 
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Figure 2. Absolute number of Benedictine monasteries and collegiate churches over time 
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Figure 3. Corporate governance mechanisms of the Benedictines 
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Table 1. Survival and closure of monasteries 
 
Reason for closures 
 
Number of  
Benedictine 
Monasteries  
in % Average 
lifetime  
in years 
Year of the 
last event 
No closure 25 17% 287 - 
Non agency problem related closures     
Voluntary closure 
External institutional factors 
6 
79 
4%               
53% 
540 
568 
1883 
1862 
 85 57% - - 
Agency problem related closures     
Mismanagement 20 13%                    387 1862 
Change into other organizational form 11 6%                    313 1763 
Control failure   9 7%          325 1773 
 40 26% - - 
Total closures 125 83% - - 
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Appendix I: All Benedictine abbeys ever in Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria and German speaking Switzerland, incl. reasons for closure 
 
 
Abbey    Year   Closure  Reason     Year  Closure  Reason  
   established        rebuilt        
 
Alpirsbach  1095  1535  Reformation 1: T. in Prot. school  1629  1648  Restitution edict 
Amorbach  approx. 700 1803  Secularization 
Andechs  1455  approx. 1570 Reformation 2: Running short of novices  1588  1803  Secularization 
       Custom loses relevance (e.g. pilgrimage)       
Anhausen  1113  1558  Reformation 1: T. in Prot. chapter  1629  1648  Restitution edict 
Ansbach  748  approx.1000 T. in collegiate chapter (until 15639) 
Asbach   1139  1803  Secularization 
Attel   1145  1803  Secularization 
Augsburg St.Stephan 1834  -- 
Augsburg St.Ulrich 1012  1537  Reformation 1    1548  1802  Secularization 
and Afra 
Auhausen  approx. 1100 1534  Reformation 1 
Aura an der Saale 1113  1564  Mismanagement (plus warlike troubles) 
Bad Wimpfen  1947  --  (Refoundation of the Abbey of Grüssau, frightened away during second World War) 
Banz   approx. 1060 1568  Reformation 2, neglect   1574  1803  Secularization 
Benediktbeuren  approx. 740 1803  Secularization 
Beinwil-Mariastein approx. 1100 1554  Extinction of the Convent, because of  1633  --   many times in exile 
destruction and peasant uprising            
Berg im Donaugau 769  approx. 900 Raids by the Hungarians 
Beuron   1868  -- 
Biburg   1133  1554  Reformation 2, extinction of the Convent, disciplinary and economic problems  
Blaubeuren  1085  1562  Reformation 1: T. in Prot. school  1630  1648    Restitution edict  
Chiemsee  approx. 750 891  Subordination        
Disentis   approx. 750 --  Oldest abbey in this examination, continuously occupied 
Donauwörth   1110  1803  Secularization 
Ebersberg  1013  1590  Mismanagement (Reformation brings few new entrants) 
Echenbrunn  1120  approx. 1445 Extinction of the Convent   approx. 1460 1557  Reformation 1: Destroying 
Eichstätt  1166  approx. 1350 Too little income, shortage of novices (1422 pursued as collegiate church) 
 
 
                                                 
9 http://www.ansbach.de/cda/showpage.php?SiteID=66&lang=de, 23.08.2007. 
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Abbey    Year   Closure  Reason     Year  Closure  Reason  
   established        rebuilt        
 
Einsiedeln  934  1798  Helvetik: short term closure of the abbey 1803  -- 
Elchingen  approx. 1120 1802  Secularization 
Ellwangen  764  1460  Collegiate chapter (until 1802)10, additionally caused through rising costs, plague and fires 
Engelberg  approx. 1100 --   
Ensdorf   1121  1525  Neglect     1695  1802  Secularization 
Erlach   approx. 1100 1528  Reformation 1   
Ettal   1332  1803  Secularization    1907  -- 
Ettenheimmünster approx. 800 1803  Secularization 
Faurndau  approx. 800 approx. 1120 T. in collegiate chapter (until 153611) 
Feuchtwangen  approx. 800 approx. 1004 Presumable t. in collegiate chapter 
Fischingen  approx. 1138 1531  Reformation 1    1540  1848  Political shut down (liberalism) 
Frauenzell  1424  1522  Mismanagement, misconduct of the rule 1582  1803  Secularization 
Fultenbach  approx. 739 1449  Decline leads to    1471  1773  Overextension: forced  
administration by the Augsburger  administration by the abbeys of 
Hochstift (influence of the diocese) Neresheim / Ottobeuren12  
Füssen   approx. 750 1802  Secularization 
Gengenbach  approx. 740 1807   Secularization 
Gottesaue  approx. 1080 1527  Assumed to be destroyed in peasant wars 1630   1648  Restitution edict 
Heidenheim  752  1537  Reformation, rather 213 
Herrieden  approx. 790 888  Bishop closes abbey (adoption of the manors) 
Hirsau   approx. 830 approx. 1000 T. in collegiate chapter, then closure  1065  1560  Reformation 1: T. in Prot. school 
   1630  1648  Restitution edict 
Honau (Schottenkloster) approx. 730 approx. 1000 Secularization, t. in collegiate chapter (at least until 1398)   
Ilmmünster  approx. 762 1060  T. in collegiate chapter until 149314 
                                                 
10 http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/F%C3%BCrstpropstei_Ellwangen, 23.08.2007. 
11 http://www.la-bw.de/kloester-bw/klostertexte.php?kreis=Lkr.%20Göppingen&bistum=&alle=1&ungeteilt=&art=&orden=&orte=&buchstabe=&nr=55&thema=Geschichte, 
23.08.2007. 
12 http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kloster_Fultenbach, 23.08.2007. 
13 http://www.hahnenkamm.de/heidenheim/kloster/, 23.08.2007. 
14 http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kloster_Ilmm%C3%BCnster, 18.09.2007. 
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Abbey    Year   Closure  Reason     Year  Closure  Reason  
   established        rebuilt        
 
Irsee   1186  1802  Secularization 
Isny   1096  1350  Plague     1362  1803  Secularization 
Jonschwil  before 900 approx. 950 Supposedly extinction of the noble family 
Kastl   1102  1563  Reformation 2, voluntary hand over (preceding mismanagement) 
Kempten  752  1803  Secularization 
Komburg  1078  1488  T. in collegiate chapter (until 1802) 
Konstanz (Schottenkl.)) approx. 1100 1529  Neglect, abbey loses significance. Closed through the city of Konstanz (fostered through Reformation)  
Luzern   approx. 740 approx. 820 Crisis of the nobility   850  approx. 1000  Downgraded to a dependent house  
               (Murbach), background unknown 
Lorch   approx. 1100 1563  Reformation more likely 1  1630   1648  Restitution edict 
Mallersdorf  1109  1803  Secularization (16th century: major troubles, partial dependence) 
Marienberg  approx. 1090 1808  Secularization    1816  -- 
Memmingen  1167  1435  Extinction → Downgraded to dependent 1483  1498  Voluntary takeover through  
house          Augustinians due to extinction 
Metten   766  approx. 910 Raid by the Hungarians   1157  1803  Secularization 
            1840  -- 
Michelfeld  1119  1556  Reformation 1    1695  1803  Secularization 
Michelsberg  1015  1803  Secularization 
Mönchröden  approx. 1147 1525  Reformation 1 (preceding plundering by peasants) 
Mönchsdeggingen approx. 950 1802  Secularization 
Moosburg  8 cent.  1027  T. in collegiate chapter (until 159815) 
Mosbach  approx. 770 approx. 1010 T. in collegiate chapter (until 1556)  
Münchaurach  approx. 1126 1525  Destroyed in peasants’ revolt  
München St. Bonifaz 1850  -- 
Münchsmünster  approx. 750 approx. 910 Raids by the Hungarians   approx. 1130  1554   Extinction during Reformation (2) 
Münchsteinach  1133  1529  Reformation 1 
Münsterschwarzach 815  1803  Secularization    1914  1941  Shut down 3. Reich 
            1945  -- 
Muri   1065  1841  Political closure (liberalism)  1846  --   Asylum and restart in Gries 
                                                 
15 http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benutzer:Schnatz/Liste_der_Benediktinerkl%C3%B6ster, 23.08.2007. 
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Abbey    Year   Closure  Reason     Year  Closure  Reason  
   established        rebuilt        
Murrhardt  approx. 800 1552  Reformation more likely 116, Prot. school 1634   1648  Restitution edict 
Neresheim  1120  1802  Secularization    1920  -- 
Neuburg  1928  -- 
Neustadt am Main 768  1803  Secularization 
Niederaltaich  741  1803  Secularization    1930   -- 
Nürnberg (Schottenkl.) approx. 1140 1525  Reformation 2: Voluntary hand over 
Oberaltaich  approx. 1100 1803  Secularization 
Ochsenhausen  1392  1803  Secularization 
Odenheim  approx. 1110 1503  T. into chapter of knights (until 180317) 
Ottobeuren  approx. 764 1802  Secularization partially avoided:  1920   --   Monastery never completely  
Soon t. in a priory (dependent house)     deserted  
Petershausen  993  1530  Reformation 1: Turnout and destruction 1556  1802  Secularization  
Pfäfers   approx. 750 1838  French Revolution leads to economic misery, additionally identity crises about direction and calling of the abbey 
(Pfaffenmünster       (insufficient information) 
Plankstetten  1129  1806  Secularization    1917  -- 
Prüfening  1109  1803  Secularization 
Prüll   approx. 997 1485  Encumbrance leads to takeover (Carthusians) 
Regensburg St.Emmeram  before 739 1812  Secularization 
Regensburg St. Jakob 1089  1862  Reduction of members leads to t. in priory and finally to closure  
(Schottenkloster) 
Reichenau  approx. 724 1540  Hostile incorporation in the diocese of Konstanz (bishop chapter) and Downgrading in priory (until 1799) 
Reichenbach  1118  1556  Reformation, more likely 2  1695  1803  Secularization 
(voluntary: abbot) 
Rheinau   approx. 780 1799  Helvetik: The French close the abbey 1803   1862   Political closing (liberalism) 
after the battle of Zurich     
Rohr   1946  -- 
Rott am Inn  approx. 1083 1803  Secularization 
Schaffhausen  approx. 1060 1524   Reformation 2, t. in collegiate chapter (until 1529)  
Schäftlarn  762  approx. 930 unknown    1910  -- 
Scheyern18  1095  1803  Secularization    1842  -- 
                                                 
16 http://www.murrhardt.de/index.php3?ber=m2&topic=geschichte_kloster2, 23.08.2007 
17 http://www.odna.de/frames/start-frame.htm, 23.08.2007 
18 In Bavaria King Ludwig 1 deserves extraordinary merits. After secularization, many abbeys could be ‘resurrected’ due to his support. 
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Abbey    Year   Closure  Reason     Year  Closure  Reason  
   established        rebuilt        
 
Schienen  approx. 800 909  Incorporation in the abbey of Reichenau  (1215-1757 Propstei), inexplicit if hostile.  
Schlehdorf  approx. 740 approx. 1100 Probably t. in collegiate chapter (from 1140 collegiate chapter of the Augustinians)19 
Schliersee  approx. 779 approx. 900 unclear, later collegiate chapter (1141 - 1803) 
Schuttern  approx. 750 1806  Secularization 
Schwarzach  pres.  749 approx. 1000  unclear     1124  1588  Encumbrance, internal discord,  
1590  1803  Secularization         external pressure 
Schweiklberg  1914  1941  Shut down 3. Reich    1945   -- 
Seeon   994  1803  Secularization 
Sinsheim  approx. 1095 1496  T. in collegiate chapter (until 1565 (Reformation)) 
Staffelsee  approx. 738 810  unclear 
St. Blasien  approx. 1000 1806  Secularization 
Stein am Rhein  approx. 970 1581  Voluntary incorporation in the abbey of Petershausen 
St. Gall   719  1805  Lack of adaptability, monastery insists on exceptional position under constitutional law - political closing  
St. Georgen  1083  1806  Secularization (Reformation: 1566 turnout and rebuilt in Villingen)  
St. Johann  approx. 1100 1555  Hostile takeover through the abbey of St. Gall. Downgrade into priory  
St. Ottilien  1893  1941  Shut down 3. Reich   1945  -- 
St. Peter im Schwarzwald 1093  1806  Secularization 
St. Trudpert  pres. 9 cent. 1806  Secularization 
St. Veit bei Neumarkt 1121  1802  Secularization 
Tegernbach  approx. 750 approx. 900 unclear 
Tegernsee  approx. 750 1803  Secularization 
Theres   approx. 1045 1802  Secularization 
Thierhaupten  approx. 750 approx. 900 Raids by the Hungarians.    1028  1452 Economical and moral  
approx 1500 1803  Secularization         impoverishment: Administrators 
                bridge over 
Trub   1139  1528  Reformation  
Vornbach  1094  1803  Secularization 
Wagenhusen  1119  1417  Hostile incorporation in the abbey of Schaffhausen 
 
 
 
                                                 
19 http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kloster_Schlehdorf, 23.08.2007. 
 
 40 
Abbey    Year   Closure  Reason     Year  Closure  Reason  
   established        rebuilt        
 
Weihenstephan  1021  1803  Secularization 
Weingarten  approx. 74020 1802  Secularization    1922  1940  Shut down 3. Reich  
   1946  --         
Weissenohe  1053  1554  Reformation more likely 2 because of 1695  1803  Secularization 
encumbrance, bad discipline and recruiting problems  
Weltenburg  7 cent.  approx. 900 Raids by the Hungarians    approx. 1000 1123  Hostile takeover Augustinians
 1128  1803  Secularization, from 1842 priory  1913  --    
Wessobrunn approx. 750 approx. 900 Raids by the Hungarians   1065  1323  Encumbrance, short term  
incorporation into the Cistercian  
after 1323 1803  Secularization         Abbey of Stams   
Wiblingen  1093  1806  Secularization 
Wiesensteig  861  approx. 1100 T. in collegiate chapter (unti1803) 
Wülzburg  approx. 1050 1523  T. in collegiate chapter (until 1537 Reformation) 
Würzburg St. Burkard  748  10 cent.  unclear     983  1464  T. in chapter of knights 
(until 1803)21 
Würzburg (Schottenkl.) 1134  1497  Running out of novices    1504  1547  Running out a second time 
   1595  1763  T. in priory 
Würzburg St. Stephan approx. 1057 1803  Secularization 
Zwiefalten  1091  1802  Secularization 
 
 
Legend 
Reformation 1: Forced closure 
Reformation 2: Indirect closure (voluntary hand over due to changed mentality, declining convents, weakening of the community)  
Prot.: Protestant 
T.: Transformation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
20 Founded in Altomünster, transfer in 1056 
21 http://www.wuerzburg.de/tourismus/sehenswertes/31,1737.html, 23.08.2007. 
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Appendix II: Average lifetime of the abbeys  
 
 
Abbey 
Year 
established
Closure or still 
in existence Refoundation
Closure or still 
in existence Refoundation
Closure or still 
in existence Refoundation
Closure or still 
in existence 
Lifetime 
 
Alpirsbach  1095 1535 1629 1648     459
Amorbach        
       
       
        
        
        
        
       
         
        
      
        
       
        
       
        
       
        
        
         
        
       
        
       
        
        
        
       
700 1803 1103
Andechs 1455 1570 1588 1803 330
Anhausen 1113 1558 1629 1648 464
Ansbach 748 1000 252
Asbach 1139 1803 664
Attel 1145 1803 658
Augsburg St.Stephan 1834 2007 173
Augsburg St.Ulrich und Afra 
 
1012 1537 1548 1802     779 
Auhausen 1100 1534 434
Aura an der Saale 1113 1564 451
Bad Wimpfen
 
1947 2007 60
Banz 1060 1568 1574 1803 737
Benediktbeuren 740 1803 1063
Beinwil-Mariastein 1100 1554 1633 2007 828
Berg im Donaugau
 
769 900 131
Beuron 1868 2007 139
Biburg 1133 1554 421
Blaubeuren 1085 1562 1630 1648 495
Chiemsee 750 891 141
Disentis 750 2007 1257
Donauwörth 1110 1803 693
Ebersberg 1013 1590 577
Echenbrunn 1120 1445 1460 1557 422
Eichstätt 1166 1350 184
Einsiedeln 934 1798 1803 2007 1068
Elchingen 1120 1802 682
Ellwangen 764 1460 696
Engelberg 1100 2007 907
Ensdorf 1121 1525 1695 1802 511
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Abbey 
Year 
established
Closure or still 
in existence Refoundation
Closure or still 
in existence Refoundation
Closure or still 
in existence Refoundation
Closure or still 
in existence 
Lifetime 
 
Erlach  1100 1528       428
Ettal       
        
       
        
       
       
       
        
        
       
        
        
     
        
        
        
       
        
        
        
        
        
      
       
        
       
       
    
       
        
        
        
1332 1803 1907 2007 571
Ettenheimmünster
 
800 1803 1003
Faurndau 800 1120 320
Feuchtwangen 800 1004 204
Fischingen 1138 1531 1540 1848 701
Frauenzell 1424 1522 1582 1803 319
Fultenbach 739 1449 1471 1773 1012
Füssen 750 1802 1052
Gengenbach 740 1807 1067
Gottesaue 1080 1527 1630 1648 465
Heidenheim 752 1537 785
Herrieden 790 888 98
Hirsau 830 1000 1065 1560 1630 1648 683
Honau 730 1000 270
Ilmmünster 762 1060 298
Irsee 1186 1802 616
Isny 1096 1350 1362 1803 695
Jonschwil 850 950 100
Kastl 1102 1563 461
Kempten 752 1803 1051
Komburg 1078 1488 410
Konstanz (Schott.)
 
1100 1529 429
Luzern 740 820 850 1000 230
Lorch 1100 1563 1630 1648 481
Mallersdorf 1109 1803 694
Marienberg 1090 1808 1816 2007 909
Memmingen 1167 1435 1483 1498 283
Metten 766 950 1157 1803 1840 2007 997
Michelfeld 1119 1556 1695 1803 545
Michelsberg 1015 1803 788
Mönchröden 1147 1525 378
Mönchsdeggingen 950 1802 852
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Abbey 
Year 
established
Closure or still 
in existence Refoundation
Closure or still 
in existence Refoundation
Closure or still 
in existence Refoundation
Closure or still 
in existence 
Lifetime 
 
Moosburg  750 1027       277
Mosbach        
        
        
       
        
     
      
       
       
        
         
       
        
       
        
        
       
       
        
       
        
        
         
        
       
       
       
        
         
        
       
       
770 1010 240
Münchaurach 1126 1525 399
München St.Bonifaz 1850 2007 157
Münchsmünster 750 950 1130 1554 624
Münchsteinach 1133 1529 396
Münsterschwarzach
 
815 1803 1914 1941 1945 2007 1077
Muri 1065 1841 1846 2007 937
Murrhardt 800 1552 1634 1648 766
Neresheim 1120 1802 1920 2007 769
Neuburg 1928 2007 79
Neustadt am Main 768 1803 1035
Niederaltaich 741 1803 1930 2007 1139
Nürnberg Schottenkloster
 
1140 1525 385
Oberaltaich 1100 1803 703
Ochsenhausen 1392 1803 411
Odenheim 1110 1503 393
Ottobeuren 764 1802 1920 2007 1125
Petershausen 993 1530 1556 1802 783
Pfäfers 750 1838 1088
Plankstetten 1129 1806 1917 2007 767
Prüfening 1109 1803 694
Prüll 997 1485 488
Regensburg St.Emmeram
 
739 1812 1073
Regensburg St. Jakob
 
1089 1862 773
Reichenau 724 1540 816
Reichenbach 1118 1556 1659 1803 582
Rheinau 780 1799 1803 1862 1078
Rohr 1946 2007 61
Rott am Inn 1083 1803 720
Schaffhausen 1060 1524 464
Schäftlarn 762 930 1910 2007 265
Scheyern 1095 1803 1842 2007 873
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Abbey 
Year 
established
Closure or still 
in existence Refoundation
Closure or still 
in existence Refoundation
Closure or still 
in existence Refoundation
Closure or still 
in existence 
Lifetime 
 
Schienen  800 909       109
Schlehdorf        
        
        
    
       
       
        
        
        
         
       
        
        
       
       
        
       
        
        
    
       
        
        
        
    
       
   
    
       
        
        
740 1100 360
Schliersee 779 900 121
Schuttern 750 1806 1056
Schwarzach 749 1000 1124 1588 1590 1803 928
Schweiklberg
 
1914 1941 1945 2007 89
Seeon 994 1803 809
Sinsheim 1095 1496 401
Staffelsee 738 810 72
St. Blasien 1000 1806 806
Stein am Rhein
  
970 1581 611
St. Gall 719 1805 1086
St. Georgen 1083 1806 723
St. Johann 1100 1555 455
St. Ottilien 1893 1941 1945 2007 110
St. Peter im Schwarzwald 
 
1093 1806       713 
St. Trudpert 850 1806 956
St. Veit bei Neumarkt
 
1121 1802 681
Tegernbach 750 900 150
Tegernsee 750 1803 1053
Theres 1045 1802 757
Thierhaupten
 
750 900 1028 1452 1500 1803 877
Trub 1139 1528 389
Vornbach 1094 1803 709
Wagenhusen 1119 1417 298
Weihenstephan 1021 1803 782
Weingarten 740 1802 1922 1940 1946 2007 1141
Weissenohe 1053 1554 1695 1803 609
Weltenburg 700 900 1000 1123 1128 1803 1913 2007 1092
Wessobrunn 750 900 1065 1323 1340 1803 871
Wiblingen 1093 1806 713
Wiesensteig 861 1100 239
Wülzburg 1050 1523 473
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Abbey 
Year 
established
Closure or still 
in existence Refoundation
Closure or still 
in existence Refoundation
Closure or still 
in existence Refoundation
Closure or still 
in existence 
Lifetime 
 
Würzburg St. Burkard 748 748 900 983 1464     633 
W. Schottenkloster 1134 1497 1504 1547 1595 1763   574 
W. St. Stephan        
        
1057 1803 746
Zwiefalten 1091 1802 711
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Appendix III: Average lifetime of the abbeys, ignoring the period until 1000 AD and momentary closures and Refoundations. 
Re-installations after complete shut downs, counted as separate organizations. Systematization of the reasons for closure.   
 
 
Abbey 
Year 
established 
Closure or still 
in existence Refoundation
Closure 
or still in 
existence Refoundation
Closure 
or still in 
existence 
Lifetime 
1. Period 
Lifetime 
2. Period 
Lifetime 
3. Period 
Reason for 
closure  
Alpirsbach    1095 1535     440 0 0 1  
Amorbach        
       
        
         
         
         
        
         
        
        
       
       
         
         
         
          
         
      
        
         
         
         
         
     3   
1000 1803 803 0 0 1  
Andechs 1455 1570 1588 1803
 
115 215 0 3 1
Anhausen 1113 1558 445 0 0 1
Asbach 1139 1803 664 0 0 1
Attel 1145 1803 658 0 0 1
Augsburg St.Stephan 1834 2007 173 0 0 2
Augsburg St.Ulrich 
and Afra 1012 1537 1548 1802
 
  525 254 0  1 1  
Auhausen 1100 1534 434 0 0 1  
Aura an der Saale 1113 1564     451 0 0  3   
Bad Wimpfen 1947 2007 60 0 0 2  
Banz 1060 1568 1574 1803
 
508 229 0 3 1
Benediktbeuren 1000 1803 803 0 0 1  
Beinwil-Mariastein
 
1100 1554 1633 2007
 
454 374 0 1 2 
Beuron 1868 2007 139 0 0 2  
Biburg 1133 1554 421 0 0 3  
Blaubeuren 1085 1562 477 0 0 1  
Disentis 1000 2007 1007 0 0 2  
Donauwörth 1110 1803 693 0 0 1  
Ebersberg 1013 1590 577 0 0 3  
Echenbrunn 1120 1445 1460 1557
 
325 97 0  3 1
Eichstätt 1166 1350 184 0 0 3  
Einsiedeln 1000 2007 1007 0 0 2  
Elchingen 1120 1802 682 0 0 1  
Ellwangen 1000 1460 460 0 0 4  
Engelberg 1100 2007 907 0 0 2  
Ensdorf 1121 1525 1695 1802 404 107 0 1
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Abbey 
Year 
established 
Closure or still 
in existence Refoundation
Closure 
or still in 
existence Refoundation
Closure 
or still in 
existence 
Lifetime 
1. Period 
Lifetime 
2. Period 
Lifetime 
3. Period 
Reason of 
closing  
Erlach    1100 1528     428 0 0 1  
Ettal        
        
        
       
        
       
        
         
         
         
         
         
         
        
        
         
         
         
        
         
         
      
        
       
        
         
         
         
         
         
         
1332 1803 1907 2007
 
471 100 0 1 2
Ettenheimmünster
 
1000 1803 803 0 0 1  
Faurndau 1000 1120 120 0 0 4  
Fischingen 1138 1531 1540 1848 393 308 0  1 1
Frauenzell 1424 1522 1582 1803 98 221 0 3 1
Fultenbach 1000 1449 1471 1773
 
449 302 0  5 5
Füssen 1000 1802 802 0 0 1  
Gengenbach 1000 1807 807 0 0 1  
Gottesaue 1080 1527 447 0 0 1  
Heidenheim 1000 1537 537 0 0 6  
Hirsau 1065 1560 495 0 0 1  
Ilmmünster 1000 1060 60 0 0 4  
Irsee 1186 1802 616 0 0 1  
Isny 1096 1350 1362 1803
 
254 441 0 1 1
Kastl 1102 1563 461 0 0 6  
Kempten 1000 1803 803 0 0 1  
Komburg 1078 1488 410 0 0 4  
Konstanz (Schott.)
 
1100 1529 429 0 0 3  
Lorch 1100 1563 463 0 0 1  
Mallersdorf 1109 1803 694 0 0 1  
Marienberg 1090 2007 917 0 0 2  
Memmingen 1167 1435 1483 1498 268 15 0  3 5
Metten 1157 1803 1840 2007 646 167 0 1 2
Michelfeld 1119 1556 1695 1803
 
437 108 0  1 1
Michelsberg 1015 1803 788 0 0 1  
Mönchröden 1147 1525 378 0 0 1  
Mönchsdeggingen 1000 1802 802 0 0 1  
Münchaurach 1126 1525 399 0 0 1  
München St.Bonifaz 1850 2007 157 0 0 2  
Münchsmünster 1130 1554 424 0 0 3  
Münchsteinach 1133 1529 396 0 0 1  
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Abbey 
Year 
established 
Closure or still 
in existence Refoundation
Closure 
or still in 
existence Refoundation
Closure 
or still in 
existence 
Lifetime 
1. Period 
Lifetime 
2. Period 
Lifetime 
3. Period 
Reason of 
closing  
Münsterschwarzach 1000 1803 1914 2007   803 93 0     1 2
Muri 1065       
         
       
        
      
         
         
         
         
      
      
         
      
        
          
          
          
        
      
        
         
         
         
        
        
         
      
        
2007  942 0 0 2  
Murrhardt 1000 1552 552 0 0 1  
Neresheim 1120 1802 1920 2007
 
682 87 0  1 2
Neuburg 1928 2007 79 0 0 2  
Neustadt am Main 1000 1803     803 0 0  1   
Niederaltaich 1000 1803 1930 2007 803 77 0  1 2
Nürnberg 
Schottenkloster 1140 1525 385 0 0 6  
Oberaltaich 1100 1803 703 0 0 1  
Ochsenhausen 1392 1803 411 0 0 1  
Odenheim 1110 1503 393 0 0 4  
Ottobeueren 1000 1802 1920 2007 802 87 0  1 2
Petershausen 993 1530 1556 1802
 
537 246 0  1 1
Pfäfers 1000 1838 838 0 0 6 (1)  
Plankstetten 1129 1806 1917 2007
 
677 90 0  1 2
Prüfening 1109 1803 694 0 0 1  
Prüll 1000 1485 485 0 0 5 (2)  
Regensburg 
St.Emmeram 1000 1812 812 0 0 1  
Regensburg St. Jakob
 
1089 1862 773 0 0 3  
Reichenau 1000 1540 540 0 0 5  
Reichenbach 1118 1556 1659 1803
 
438 144 0  6 1
Rheinau 1000 1862 862 0 0 1  
Rohr 1946 2007 61 0 0 2  
Rott am Inn 1083 1803     720 0 0  1   
Schaffhausen 1060 1524 464 0 0 4  
Schäftlarn 1910 2007 97 0 0 2  
Scheyern 1095 1803 1842 2007
 
708 165 0 1 2
Schlehdorf 1000 1100 100 0 0 4  
Schuttern 1000 1806 806 0 0 1  
Schwarzach 1124 1588 1590 1803
 
464 213 0  3 1
Schweiklberg 1914 2007 93 0 0 2  
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Abbey 
Year 
established 
Closure or still 
in existence Refoundation
Closure 
or still in 
existence Refoundation
Closure 
or still in 
existence 
Lifetime 
1. Period 
Lifetime 
2. Period 
Lifetime 
3. Period 
Reason of 
closing  
Seeon    1000 1803     803 0 0 1  
Sinsheim         
         
        
         
         
         
        
         
        
         
      
       
         
         
         
      
      
    
    
        
         
         
        
       
         
1095 1496 401 0 0 4  
St. Blasien 1000 1806 806 0 0 1  
Stein am Rhein 
  
1000 1581     581 0 0  6 (3)   
St. Gall 1000 1805 805 0 0 3  
St. Georgen 1083 1806 723 0 0 1  
St. Johann 1100 1555 455 0 0 5  
St. Ottilien 1893 2007 114 0 0 2  
St. Peter im 
Schwarzwald 1093 1806 713 0 0 1  
St. Trudpert 1000 1806 806 0 0 1  
St. Veit bei Neumarkt 
 
1121 1802     681 0 0  1   
Tegernsee 1000 1803 803 0 0 1  
Theres 1045 1802 757 0 0 1  
Thierhaupten
 
1028 1452 1500 1803
 
424 303 0  3 1
Trub 1139 1528 389 0 0 1  
Vornbach 1094 1803 709 0 0 1  
Wagenhusen 1119 1417 298 0 0 5  
Weihenstephan 1021 1803 782 0 0 1  
Weingarten 1000 1802 1922 2007 802 85 0  1 2
Weissenohe 1053 1554 1695 1803 501 108 0  3 1
Weltenburg 1000 1123 1128 1803 1913
 
2007
 
123 675 94  5 1 2
Wessobrunn 1065 1323 1340 1803
 
258 463 0  5 1
Wiblingen 1093 1806 713 0 0 1  
Wiesensteig 1000 1100 100 0 0 4  
Wülzburg 1050 1523 473 0 0 4  
Würzburg St. Burkard 1000 1464 464 0 0 4  
W. Schottenkloster 1134 1497 1504 1547
 
1595 1763
 
363 43 168  3 3 4 
W. St. Stephan 1057 1803 746 0 0 1  
Zwiefalten 1091 1802 711 0 0 1  
 
Legend: 1 = External institutional factors, 2 = No closing, 3 = Mismanagement, 4 = Change into other organizational form, 5 = Control failure, 6 = Voluntary closing 
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Appendix IV: Average lifetime of the collegiate chapters (years)  
 
 
Year 
established Closure Lifetime 
Ansbach 1000 1563 563
Ellwangen 1460 1802 342
Faurndau 1120 1536 416
Hirsau 1000 1065 65
Honau 1000 1398 398
Illmünster 1060 1493 433
Komburg 1488 1802 314
Moosburg 1027 1598 571
Mosbach 1010 1556 546
Odenheim 1503 1803 300
Schaffhausen 1524 1529 5
Schlehdorf 1100 1140 40
Schliersee 1141 1803 662
Sinsheim 1496 1565 69
Wiesensteig 1100 1803 703
Wülzburg 1523 1537 14
Würzburg St.Burkard 1464 1803 339
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
